I have published on various topics in epistemology, including feminist epistemology, the genealogy of knowledge, contextualism, epistemic normativity, political epistemology, epistemic relativism, and epistemic pluralism. I have also dabbled in ethics, the philosophy of language, political philosophy, and the philosphy of science.
I have recently published my first book, a defence of non-ideal epistemology (titled, surprisingly enough, Non-Ideal Epistemology) with Oxford University Press. You can order it here (OUP UK) or here (Amazon UK). Among other things, this book argues that we should adopt a non-ideal approach to epistemology that broadly parallels non-ideal theory in social and political philosophy. It also applies this non-ideal approach to several topics in contemporary applied and social epistemology including science denial, cognitive bias, and norms of social interaction.
My current projects include writing a book on the ethics and epistemology of influence, and assorted papers on various topics in ethics, epistemology and social philosophy. While there are a few themes that unify my work, one of the main ones is a commitment to developing a naturalised epistemology that looks beyond psychology and takes sociology seriously as a source of insights about the production of knowledge. I am also co-editing a book on the European Face of Political Epistemology with Hana Samaržija (Warwick), which will be published by Palgrave Macmillan.
I have recently published my first book, a defence of non-ideal epistemology (titled, surprisingly enough, Non-Ideal Epistemology) with Oxford University Press. You can order it here (OUP UK) or here (Amazon UK). Among other things, this book argues that we should adopt a non-ideal approach to epistemology that broadly parallels non-ideal theory in social and political philosophy. It also applies this non-ideal approach to several topics in contemporary applied and social epistemology including science denial, cognitive bias, and norms of social interaction.
My current projects include writing a book on the ethics and epistemology of influence, and assorted papers on various topics in ethics, epistemology and social philosophy. While there are a few themes that unify my work, one of the main ones is a commitment to developing a naturalised epistemology that looks beyond psychology and takes sociology seriously as a source of insights about the production of knowledge. I am also co-editing a book on the European Face of Political Epistemology with Hana Samaržija (Warwick), which will be published by Palgrave Macmillan.
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Books
Non-Ideal Epistemology. Oxford University Press. Edited Volumes: Social Epistemology and Relativism. Eds. N. Ashton, M. Kusch, R. McKenna and K. Sodoma. Routledge. Epistemic Realism and Anti-Realism. Eds. R. McKenna and C. Kyriacou. Palgrave. Journal Articles: The Duty to Listen. Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (w/Hrishikesh Joshi). Is Knowledge a Social Phenomenon? Forthcoming in Inquiry. A Non-Ideal Theory of Knowledge. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Assertion, Action and Context. In Synthese (w/Michael Hannon). Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology. In Erkenntnis (w/J. Adam Carter). Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning. In Canadian Journal of Philosophy (w/J. Adam Carter. The Genealogical Method in Epistemology. In Synthese (w/Martin Kusch). Situating Feminist Epistemology. In Episteme (w/Natalie Ashton). Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief. In Journal of Applied Philosophy. Kornblith versus Sosa on Grades of Knowledge. In Synthese (w/J. Adam Carter). No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering 'Woman'. In Logos & Episteme. Clifford and the Common Epistemic Norm. In American Philosophical Quarterly. Revisionary Epistemology. In Inquiry (w/Davide Fassio). Assertion, Complexity and Sincerity. In Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Epistemic Contextualism Defended. In Synthese. Disagreeing About ‘Ought’. In Ethics. Shifting Targets and Disagreements. In Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Normative Scorekeeping. In Synthese. ‘Knowledge’ Ascriptions, Social Roles and Semantics. In Episteme. Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach. In Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm. In Logos & Episteme. Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism and Disagreement. In Philosophical Writings. Interests Contextualism. In Philosophia. |
Articles in Edited Volumes:
Persuasion and Intellectual Autonomy. In Epistemic Autonomy. Eds. K. Lougheed and J. Matheson. Routledge. In (Partial) Defence of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism. In Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Eds. K Kyriacou and K. Wallbridge. Routledge. Persuasion and Epistemic Paternalism. In Epistemic Paternalism. Eds. G Axtell & A. Bernal. Rowman & Littlefield. Pragmatic Encroachment and Feminist Epistemology. In Social Epistemology and Relativism. Eds. N. Ashton, M. Kusch, R. McKenna & K. Sodoma. Routledge. The Genealogy of Relativism and Absolutism. In Metaepistemology. Eds. C. Kyriacou & R. McKenna. Palgrave. Pluralism about Knowledge. In Epistemic Pluralism. Eds. A. Coliva and N. Pedersen. Palgrave. Survey Articles, Critical Notices etc.: What is Good Thinking? Comments on Mona Simion’s Shifty Speech and Independent Thought. In Inquiry. Critical Notice of Lisa Bortolotti's The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs. In Analysis. Asymmetrical Irrationality: Are Only Other People Stupid?. In Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology, eds. J. de Ridder and M. Hannon. Routledge. The Disappearance of Ignorance. In the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Critical Notice of Extended Epistemology and Socially Extended Epistemology. In Analysis. Relativism and Externalism. In Routledge Handbook of Relativism. Ed. M. Kusch. Routledge {w/J. Adam Carter). Conversational Kinematics. In Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Ed. J.J. Ichikawa. Routledge. Contextualism in Epistemology. In Analysis. Book Reviews: Endre Begby's Prejudice. In Notre Dame Philosphical Reviews. Alessandra Tanesini's Mismeasure of the Self. In Philosophical Quarterly. Nuno Venturinha's Description of Situations. In International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Quassim Cassam's Vices of the Mind. In European Journal of Philosophy. Mark McBride's Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge. In Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. Adam Carter's Metaepistemology and Relativism. In International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. John Hyman's Action, Knowledge and Will. In Analysis. Krista Lawlor's Assurance. In Philosophical Quarterly. Jose Zalabardo's Scepticism and Reliable Belief. In Mind. Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken's (eds.) Knowledge Ascriptions. In Philosophical Quarterly. Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen's (eds.) Assertion. In Mind (w/Allan Hazlett and Joey Pollock). Keith DeRose's The Case for Contextualism. In Philosophical Review (w/Duncan Pritchard). |
